PIP-4: Validator Performance Management

We like the proposal overall, but also wonder if part D adding 5 validators should be a separate proposal.

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The Active Validators are all trusted financial and technical stakeholders that uphold the network. They earn their right to vote through being a Validator (and by in the future keeping to governance-initiated performance metrics as mentioned in the proposal).

We also have to allow for privacy and anonymity.
Even though this isn’t a “DAO”, Governance on POS is Daoesque and should be as such, IMO.

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In general I like the ideas and concepts.

One thing I’d like to add is some sort of “reorg” measurement included in validator performance. At present, not only are validators not penalized for causing reorgs but they are actually rewarded for it. From an end user standpoint, this should be changed.

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I understand but having the same “company” with more than 1 vote it’s not the most equal

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Also how will the new 5 validators be selected?

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Hey @Flamingo, thank you for your questions and feedback. The method for the selection of new validators is described in Part C of the proposal. The phased approach seeks to provide a progressive roadmap for the community to first set the admission parameters, and then consequently execute on them.

We plan on providing more details of how this could work - we’re already working on it internally, but all feedback is welcome!

Your thoughts would be much appreciated in this thread.

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I would agree with the whole proposal except part of ‘Part C’.

There are two validators mentioned in ‘Part C’. I checked the staking page, the validator 139 has a very good performance with 100% ‘checkpoints signed’. Obviously they have good knowledge about how to setup and maintain the Polygon node. We can’t kick out validators just because they got a chance to be a validator. What’s wrong with those token holders who voted for well-behaved validators?
The validator 140 has missed all the checkpoints since it became a validator. I agree to kick it out under the rules of ‘Part A’ and ‘Part B’ if they’re adopted.

We’re trying to adopt new government rules and onboarding process. New rules and process should start from new validators. If we can apply the new rules to the latest 2 validators, why can’t we apply the same rules to the latest 20 validators.

Polygon POS is a permissionless network.

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Hey guys!
First of all, thanks for the whole proposal and for being interested in our opinion.

We agree that performance measurement is a must at the moment. The requirements in Part A appear objective and reasonable, and the procedures described in Part B appear sufficient to correct potential failures.

But we have a few questions about Part C and Part D:

What will the onboarding process look like? How will potential participants be evaluated and how will validators be involved in the evaluation?

In case if no one from the validator set is removed as a result of the forced unstaking, will the active validators set now consist of 105 members? If everyone will perform well, then these 5 will still be included in the active set?

Also, in “forced unstake” will only fundation tokens be unstaked or all together? Will it be like a jail in cosmos? Then the question is how to return to the set after, is it foreseen?

Thanks in advance!

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Hey Masha, thank you for your team’s feedback. It’s great to see more and more validators being involved in the discussion and so we couldn’t imagine not asking for your opinion.

Now, to answer your questions about Parts C and D one by one.

What will the onboarding process look like? How will potential participants be evaluated and how will validators be involved in the evaluation?

From the proposal:

  • Phase 1 (current) - The multi-sig holders would set the admission parameters and choose the validators.
  • Phase 2 (next step) - The governance and validator communities set and approve the parameters, and the multi-sig holders implement those parameters.
  • Phase 3 (end state) - The governance and validator communities set the parameters and admit and onboard validators themselves.

We don’t have a firm definition of phase 2 yet, but we’re looking forward to working with validators on both the particular process, as well as specific admission parameters.

For onboarding specifically, we’re looking to revamp that process completely - from providing better educational resources to involving existing validators as mentors. All of that is aimed at creating as many community-driven mechanisms as possible, working hand in hand with those who should be perceived as representatives of the ecosystem.

In case if no one from the validator set is removed as a result of the forced unstaking, will the active validators set now consist of 105 members? If everyone will perform well, then these 5 will still be included in the active set?

Yes, the validator set would consist of 105 members going forward, all of them getting a chance to participate equally.

Also, in “forced unstake” will only fundation tokens be unstaked or all together? Will it be like a jail in cosmos? Then the question is how to return to the set after, is it foreseen?

The tokens of a validator would be unstaked and the delegators would need to unstake and redelegate to another validator to earn rewards.

If an unstaked validator wanted to return to the set, they would need to go through the admission process.

I hope this clarifies things, @everstake_masha, I’m looking forward to keep the discussion going!

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Everything is clear, thank you very much for the explanations!

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We think this proposal would help improve validator performance and decentralization, and agree on part A and B.

For parts C and D, we would prefer to see separate proposals as these topics could be debated separately

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This proposal seems to provide solutions to address Polygons ‘today’ issues-- so I am happy with seeing this proposal pass.

I agree that a next phase ‘tomorrow’ solution would be to further expand in to more codified admissions (and jailing) parameters, possible KYC, and a team implementation everything after more discussion and requirements are outlined.

Expanding the current set and pruning validators that are underperforming is a quick win.

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As mentioned by others. parts C & D are a different problem and warrant a separate proposal. A nd B look good.

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We are onboard an agree with part A and B but believe it can only be implemented when Part C is agreed or disagreed on by the majority .

Question about part C 1. Validator Admission. Is it so when a failed validator is unstaked by the multisig account. Is that multisig account becomes the owner of that validator slot? and Phase 1 starts? Or is that slot now open and “Irregular Joining” is possible?

We believe when the majority agrees on PartC.1 Validator Admission, Irregular Joining should be made impossible. I think it will damage the reputation of the network if we force unstake new validators that didn’t follow the “rules” but are excellent preforming validators.

Also agree with Alex2:

The new rules and process should start from the moment we set them in place and not apply them retroactivity

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Thank you for your team’s feedback, @Kasper.

As you rightly point out, part C formalizes the admissions process and lays out a roadmap towards the governance community owning that process. Such a formalized framework is needed to go hand-in-hand with parts A and B.

To answer your question, the multi-sig doesn’t become an owner of the validator slot at any time - in the unstaking scenario, what happens is a decrease in the number of maximum validator slots (by one) along with unstaking of the underperforming validator. Consequently, an increase in that number happens once a new validator is to be onboarded.

The irregular joining scenario is only possible if a validator doesn’t communicate with the team that they intend to unstake, hence leaving the slot empty.

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PIP-4: Validator Performance Management is live for voting on Snapshot!

The community will now have a week to accept or reject the proposal.

Following the feedback received on the forum and elsewhere, we’ve decided to remove a contentious proposal in part C to unstake two validators who have joined the network in an irregular manner.

We are excited to see this vote as a major step forward for decentralized governance of the PoS chain.

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Hey All,

I wanted to share some thoughts on the set increase to 105 addressing the comments from @Flamingo and @Matt-BlocksUnited.

The Polygon POS chain currently holds $2.05bn in TVL and has matured significantly as an ecosystem since the mainnet launched in June 2020. Improving the decentralization and security of the network should be the main goal and focus.

The 5% increase in validator slots, as proposed in PIP 4, might have the following benefits:

  • Guarantees ~ 100 active nodes even when some are offline
  • Supports a wider distribution of stake which is required to improve our Nakamoto Coefficient (minimum number of nodes required to disrupt the network)
  • Enables a wider geographical distribution of nodes
  • Increase economic security. To give everyone an idea on why this is crucial: the total stake has reduced by 400m in the previous ~6 months from ~3.0b to 2.6b MATIC.
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Hi. Ideas are great, but I personally think new validator selection should be transparent even before it becomes fully decentralized, not like it is done now.

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Will the vote be accepted if less than half of the validators participate?
At the moment there are only 28 votes

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In addition to Mat’s comments:
Part C in relation to “Irregular joining” is not retrospective. It is for future situations.
Polygon simply can’t secure itself against every possible potential for irregular joining (although we are working to ensure most ways are stamped out). This part would then give the ability to offboard if those situations arise.

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