Sorry for the lack of precision in language on my part. By “transaction reordering” I meant both the ability for validators to reorder transactions within a block but moreso the ability to re-validate older blocks to keep MEV for themselves. Charlie Noyes and Paradigm Research also classify this as MEV and point out that it can destabilize consensus: https://research.paradigm.xyz/MEV
“This is known as a “time-bandit” attack: if block rewards are small enough compared to MEV, it can be rational for miners to destabilize consensus.”
Later in the article in a section entitled “Mitigating MEV” he suggests solutions, including implementing EIP-1559:
“An ideal solution would simply reduce the MEV on Ethereum, or increase the miner security incentive without additional inflation… 1. Additional Security Incentives: stable miner revenue streams other than the block reward (such as EIP-1559’s burned BASEFEEs3, or state rents) are additive to protocol security and could help offset MEV.”
So no, EIP-1559 is not a perfect nor final solution to MEV, which is sprawling in terms of attack surface. But, as Paradigm Research suggests, implementing it is a starting point.