Based on seeing it work incredibly well in the one project I’ve ever seen implement it as a strategy I’d like to propose an alternative solution to either option, and will clarify my thoughts on a few things first.
To clarify, I personally don’t feel as though 1559 is even necessary to implement on Polygon due to the fact that network fees becoming unmanageable is extremely unlikely to ever happen. If I’m simply wrong and the implementation of 1559 is necessarry to remain directly compatible with Eth as a commit-chain, just ignore this bit.
Assuming that 1559 is mandatory: Burning ETH from transaction fees makes sense as a way to reduce issues caused by MEV and whale gas-wars because these issues make eth un-useable for the average person, and undesirable to new retail investors. At the same time, it doesn’t permanently reduce the supply of Eth as it doesn’t have a hard cap at which no more will ever be produced, so a constant slow burn is sustainable without excluding new users based on an unreasonable entry price and eventually a dead network when no one is willing to keep reducing supply to transact on mainnet; burning transaction fees of $MATIC, especially considering the rate of adoption, could lead to exactly this situation, so I don’t think burning is the solution.
I think that directing fees to a DAO is likely a better option at first glance, but on closer inspection raises a few questions: Who has voting rights in the DAO? If its everyone holding $MATIC, is voting token weighted, making decentralization essentially a facade when considering that validators, whales, and the protocol teams would still have all the control? If voting were 1 vote per holder, regardless of held quantity, I think that it would be a more reasonable option. Ideally (imho) the proposed DAO would adopt Colony’s voting structure, in which the a DAO pays members in its native token for tasks completed that contribute to the improvement or development of the DAO as a whole, or to the project(s) it governs; and the payments reward the payee with reputation, which is used to determine their “vote weight”.
**The solution I think is most beneficial to users, the protocol, and the value of the Matic token : **
The basefee that would be either burned or added to the DAO treasury is instead used to supplement liquidity across leading exchanges and leading token pairs (eg: Sushi , Quickswap , and Dfyn into MATIC/DAI , MATIC/ETH, and MATIC/USDC)
after which the LIQUIDITY TOKENS are burned, or permanently locked within the DAO treasury.
If the LP tokens are burned, it serves a similar purpose in reducing the overall circulating supply of $MATIC, but in doing so also supports and bolsters the token value by creating a permanent liquidity reserve.
If the LP tokens are permanently locked into the DAO; it essentially acheives the same result of a permanent liquidity base that can’t ever be removed and constantly grows as transactions take place, but with the added benefit of the DAO generating revenue to be used in development, grants, etc. by providing a constant influx of LP rewards from transction fees.